Abstract. Many autonomous agents operate in domains in which the co-operation of their fellow agents cannot be guaranteed. In such domains co-operation may only be attained through a process of negotiation which serves to persuade others of the value of co-operation. This paper devises a general framework for negotiation through argumentation in which agents exchange proposals and counter-proposals backed by arguments which summarise the reasons why the proposal should be accepted. The argumentation is persuasive because the exchanges are able to alter the mental state of the agents involved. The framework is inspired by our work in the domain of business process management and is explained using examples from that domain.
Introduction
Negotiation is a key form of interaction in systems composed of multiple autonomous agents. In such environments, agents often have no inherent control authority over one another and so the only way they can influence the behaviour of others is to persuade them to act in particular ways. In some cases, the persuadee may require little or no convincing to act in the way desired by the persuader (e.g. because the proposed course of action is consistent with their plans and because they know the action will benefit them). However, in other cases, the persuadee may be unwilling to accept the proposal initially and must be persuaded to change its beliefs, goals or preferences so that the proposal (or some variant thereof) is accepted. In either case, the minimum requirement for negotiation is for the agents to be able to make proposals to one another which can then either be accepted or rejected (as occurs in the contract net protocol [16] , for instance). Another level of sophistication occurs when recipients do not just have the choice of accepting or rejecting proposals, but have the option of making counter offers to alter aspects of the proposal which are unsatisfactory [15] . An even more elaborate form of negotiation-argumentation-based-involves the possibility of sending justifications and/or arguments along with (counter) proposals indicating why they should be accepted [11, 13, 18] . Sentences such as:"this is my final offer, take it or leave it", "last time this job cost £5, I'm not going to pay £10 now", and "the job will take longer than usual because one of the workers is off sick" may be necessary to change the persuadees' goals or preferences.
In this paper we concentrate on argumentation-based negotiation. Clearly, this is a large research topic in its own right [9, 19] , so we limit our scope by considering only argumentation between computational agents (not with humans) and arguments in which the context is that the persuader tries to convince the persuadee to undertake a particular problem solving task (service) on its behalf. To this end, we outline the components of a formal model for the process of argumentation-based negotiation which can ultimately be used to build negotiating agents for real world applications. While we draw on our previous work in this area, in this paper we shift our attention from the mechanisms for generating counter proposals [15] and those for generating and interpreting arguments [13] to the social aspects of the negotiation. Moreover, we take advantage of the work on Dialogical Frameworks introduced in [12] to define the static aspects of the negotiation process: shared ontology, social relations, communication language and protocol. We define a minimal notion of the state of an agent which captures the evolutionary character of negotiation-enabling the resulting model to recognise different types of arguments that agents can make in support of their proposals. Finally, we indicate how these arguments can be generated and interpreted by agents.
In this paper we introduce the underlying theoretical assumptions of the model and discuss three types of illocutions: (i) threats-failure to accept this proposal means something negative will happen to you; (ii) rewards-acceptance of this proposal means something positive will happen to you; and (iii) appeals-you should prefer this option over that alternative for this reason. We realize these are a subset of the class of persuasive illocutions that are involved in argumentative negotiation (see [9] for a list based on exhaustive psychological experiments), but our emphasis is in providing an overarching framework in which the key components of argumentation can be described, rather than providing an exhaustive formalisation of all the argument types which can be found in the literature. We illustrate these constructs through a running example introduced in the following section. The main contribution of this work is, therefore, to provide a formal framework in which agents can undertake persuasive negotiation to change each others beliefs and preferences using an expressive communication language. Moreover, the framework is kept neutral with respect to the agent's internal architecture and imposes few constraints on its formal resources.
Argumentation in Business Process Management
This section describes the scenario which will be used to illustrate the principles and concepts of our model of argumentation. The scenario is motivated by work in the ADEPT project [8] which has developed negotiating agents for business process management applications. In particular, we consider a multi-agent system for managing a British Telecom (BT) business process-namely, providing a quotation for designing a network which offers particular services to a customer ( Figure 1 ). The overall process receives a customer service request as its input and generates as its output a quote specifying how much it would cost to build a network to realise that service. Here we consider a subset of the agents involved in this activity: the customer service division (CSD) agent, the design division (DD) agent, the surveyor department (SD) agent, and the various agents who provide the out-sourced service of vetting customers (VC agents). A comprehensive account of all the agents and their negotiations is given in [15] .
The first stages of the Provide Customer Quote service involve the CSD agent capturing basic information about the customer and vetting the customer in terms of their credit worthiness. The latter service is performed by one of the VC agents and negotiation is used to determine which one is selected. If the customer fails the vetting procedure, then the quote process terminates. Assuming the customer is satisfactory, the CSD agent maps their requirements against a service portfolio. If the requirements can be met by a standard off-the-shelf portfolio item then an immediate quote can be offered based on previous examples. In the case of bespoke services, however, the process is more complex. The CSD agent negotiates with the DD agent for the service of costing and designing the desired network service. To prepare a network design it is usually necessary to have a detailed plan of the existing equipment at the customer's premises. Sometimes such plans might not exist and sometimes they may be out of date. In either case, the DD agent determines whether the customer site(s) should be surveyed. If such a survey is warranted, the DD agent negotiates with the SD agent for the Survey Customer Site service. This negotiation differs from the others present in this scenario in that the two agents are part of the same department. Moreover, the DD agent has a degree of authority over SD. Agent negotiation is still required to set the timings of the service, but the SD agent cannot simply refuse to perform the service. On completion of the network design and costing, the DD agent informs the CSD agent which informs the customer of the service quote. The business process then terminates.
The precise nature of the argumentation which can occur in the aforementioned negotiations is determined by three main factors: (i) the negotiation arity-pairwise (1 to 1) negotiations (e.g. the CSD and DD agents for the design network service) differ from 1 to many negotiations (e.g. the CSD and VC agents for the Vet Customer service); (ii) the power relations [2] between the negotiatorsmost negotiations are peer-to-peer, but the DD and SD negotiation over the Survey Customer Site service is an example of boss-to-subordinate negotiation; (iii) the organisational relationship of the negotiators-some negotiations are between agents of the same organisation (e.g. the CSD, DD and SD agents), while others are between agents of different organisations (e.g. the CSD and VC agents). Our experience in the domain, shows that the argumentation between agents can be captured by the three types of argument mentioned in the Introduction-threats, rewards and appeals. Some examples of such arguments are given in Figure 2 .
Negotiation model
Our model describes the process of a single encounter negotiation between multiple agents over a deal. Deals are always between two agents, though an agent may be engaged simultaneously in negotiation with many agents for a given deal. Negotiation is achieved -in a stable social context-through the exchange of illocutions in a shared communication language CL. The actual exchange of illocutions is driven by the participating agents' individual needs and goals-something that will not be part of this negotiation model. Nevertheless, this exchange is subject to some minimal shared conventions on the intended usage of the illocutions in CL, and a simple negotiation protocol. These conventions relate to:
1. The elements that are relevant for the negotiation of a deal-in the form of issues and values that may evolve as negotiation proceeds. 2. The rationality of the participating agents-in terms of some form of preference relationships or utility functions which enable the agents to evaluate and compare different proposals. 3. The deliberation capability of the participating agents-in the form of an internal state in which the agent may register the history of the negotiation as well as the evolution of its own theoretical elements on which its decisions are founded. 4. The minimal shared meaning of the acceptable illocutions-this is captured in the way that a received illocution should be interpreted when heard by an agent, and by making explicit the conditions that enable an agent to use (or 'generate') a given illocution at a given time. Threaten to terminate current negotiation thread.
CSD-VCs
Make sure you get back to me in the specified time period or I won't involve you in future rounds of bidding.
Threaten to terminate all future negotiation threads.
DD-SD
If you cannot complete the service sooner, I'll inform your boss that we missed the deadline because of you.
Threaten to inform outside party of (perceived) poor performance.
Reward 4 CSD-DD
If you produce this design by this time we'll be able to get the quote to our major customer ahead of time.
Indicate positive effect of performing action by specified time.
CSD-VCs
If you vet this customer by this time, I'll make sure you're involved in subsequent rounds of bidding.
Promise future involvement for accepting current proposal.
Appeal 6 CSD-VCs
Last time you vetted this customer, it took this length of time and cost this much.
Appeal to precedent.
CSD-DD
You must complete this design within 48 hours because company policy says customers must be responded to within this time frame.
Appeal to (company's) prevailing practice.
VC-CSD
This customer may be in financial trouble, therefore more time is needed to carry out a higher quality vetting.
Appeal to (CSD's) self interest.
DD-CSD
The design will take longer than normal because one of our surveyors is on holiday this week.
Revealing new information.
SD-DD
Customer has many premises and they all need to be surveyed, thus this service will take longer than normal.
Fig. 2. Sample arguments in the BT application.
A minimal set of concepts which are necessary to represent the static components in automated negotiation are presented in Section 3.1, and the dynamic components-the concepts of a negotiation thread and a negotiation state-are introduced in Section 3.2. Social aspects that are relevant for persuasive arguments are treated in Section 3.3, and the process of interpreting and generating illocutions is illustrated in Section 3.4.
A Basic Negotiation Ontology
Negotiation requires communication between the agents and, for it to be unambiguous, each agent must have a unique identifier. We denote the set of identifiers of the agents involved in a negotiation as Agents 3 . The agents involved in a negotiation will have a variety of social relationships with one another. These relationships have an important impact upon the persuasion and argumentation process. For instance, prestigious speakers have a large persuasive impact and peers can be persuaded more easily than non-peers [9] . To model this characteristic, we assume that a general and shared social relation is defined between the agents. This relation can be modelled as a binary function over a set of social roles, denoted as Roles. In the BT scenario, for example, Roles would be: {Customer, Contractor, Boss, P eer}. Finally, we assume that agents, when negotiating, interchange illocutions in a common communication language CL defined over a set of illocutionary particles whose propositional content is expressed in a shared logical language L
4 . The precise nature of L is unimportant in our model (e.g. it could be a propositional language or a modal language), however it must contain at least the following:
1. Variables. To represent the issues under negotiation. They have to be variables because issues need to be bound to different values during negotiation.
Constants.
To represent values for the issues under negotiation. A special constant '?' is needed to represent the absence of value, and allow for underdefined proposals between agents 5 . 3. Equality. To specify the value of an issue under negotiation. 4. Conjunction. To define complex sentences using the previous relations.
All of these features are necessary to express the kinds of sentences involved in the negotiation proposals discussed in this paper. An example of such a sentence is:
where 'Price', 'Quality', and 'Penalty' are the issues under negotiation and so are represented as variables; '£10', 'High', and '?' are values for those issues and so are constants; '=' denotes equality; and '∧' denotes conjunction. However, the language defined so far is not expressive enough to describe everything that is involved in a negotiation. In particular, to 'reason' and 'argue' about offers it is necessary at the very least to have some way of expressing preferences between offers. Offers are formulae in L, hence the most obvious way of representing preferences between formulae would be as a second-order relation in L. However, this would mean that L would be a higher-order logic, with the associated computational problems of such logics [6] . As a result we prefer to express preferences as a meta-language M L with the following minimum requirements:
A preference meta-predicate. To express preferences between formulae in L.
For example, given the sentences Price = £10, and Price = £20 in L, we can express a preference for the first over the second as:
where 'equal' is the quoting in M L for '=' in L, and 'Pref' represents the preference meta-predicate. In the rest of the paper, instead of writing equal(⌈Price⌉, ⌈£10⌉) the more compact representation ⌈Price = £10⌉ will be used.
The common communication language, CL, accounts for the set of illocutionary particles necessary to model the set of illocutionary acts we are interested in studying in this paper. The acts can be divided into two sets, I nego corresponding to negotiation particles (those used to make offers and counter offers) and I pers corresponding to persuasive particles (those used in argumentation). I nego = {offer, request, accept, reject, withdraw}, I pers = {appeal, threaten, reward}. Other illocutions could conceivably be brought into CL but the present set is sufficient for our purposes.
The negotiation dialogue between two agents consists of a sequence of offers and counter offers containing values for the issues. These offers and counteroffers can be just conjunctions of 'issue=value' pairs (offer) or can be accompanied by persuasive arguments (threaten, reward, appeal). 'Persuasion' is a general term covering the different illocutionary acts by which agents try to change other agent's beliefs and goals. The selection of three persuasive particles in the set I pers is the result of an analysis of the domain, as explained in Section 2, as well as of the persuasion literature [9, 18] . appeal is a particle with a broad meaning, since there are many different types of appeal. For example, an agent can appeal to authority, to prevailing practice or to self-interest. The structure of the illocutionary act is appeal(a, b, ξ, [not]ϕ, t), where ϕ is the argument -a formula in L or in M L, or a possibly negated illocution in CL-that agent a communicates to b in support of a formula ξ (which may be a formula either in L or M L). All types of appeal adhere to this structure. The differing nature of the appeal is achieved by varying the ϕ in L or by varying [not]ϕ in CL. not ϕ is understood as the fact that action ϕ does not take place. On the other hand, threaten and reward are simpler in that they have a narrower range of interpretations. Their structure, threaten(a, b,
is recursive since formulae ψ 1 and ψ 2 are again possibly negated illocutions in CL. This recursive definition allows for a rich set of possible (illocutionary) actions supporting the persuasion. For instance, agent DD can threaten agent SD that it will inform SD's boss about SD's incompetence if SD does not accept a particular deal:
Having introduced all the constituent components, we can now describe our dialogical framework for persuasive negotiation.
' as an acceptable value in a deal. 5. M L is a metalanguage over L satisfying the previously expressed requirements. 6. CL is the communication language among agents. Given a, b ∈ Agents and t ∈ T ime it is defined as:
T ime is a discrete totally ordered set of instants.
Note that the time stamp, which appears as the last argument in all illocutions, will be omited when there is no ambiguity.
Agents can use the illocutions in CL according to the following negotiation protocol (see Figure  3 ): 1. A negotiation always starts with a deal proposal, i.e. an offer or request. In request illocutions the special constant '?' may appear. This is thought of as a petition to an agent to make a detailed proposal by filling the '?'s with defined values. 2. This is followed by an exchange of possibly many counter proposals (that agents may reject) and many persuasive illocutions. 3. Finally, a closing illocution is uttered, i.e. an accept or withdraw.
Negotiating agents
The Dialogical Framework described in the previous section represents the static components of the negotiation model-those that are fixed for all negotiations. This section presents the dynamic elements-those that change as a particular negotiation proceeds. Although our model aims to be as neutral as possible about the agent architecture, in order to capture essential aspects of persuation it is necessary to assume that the agents have memory and are deliberative. Memory is expressed by means of an evolving negotiation state which, in turn, requires the notion of a negotiation thread [12] to capture the history of the negotiation dialogue between a pair of agents. In accept(a, b, ϕ) and reject(a, b, ϕ) illocutions ϕ always refer to the last proposal. P roposal(x, y) stands for any illocution constructed with any of the following particles: offer, threaten, reward, appeal, and between agents x and y. We omit the time stamp in the illocutions.
if t
, where issues(x) represents the set of issues mentioned in illocution x. That is, we assume monotonicity over the set of issues under negotiation, so that once an issue has been brought into the negotiation, it is never supressed. However, we will use ellipses whenever necessary to make more compact expressions.
We denote the last illocution in a thread asθ. We say a negotiation thread ϑ is active ifθ is not an accept or withdraw illocution.
In an extension to our previous work we want to capture the idea that new issues may arise during the negotiation process. This is necessary because we consider that one of the main ways in which an agent may persuade another about the desirability of a particular proposal is to introduce new issues that have hitherto not featured in the deal. This means that we need an explicit representation of the set Ω of issues an agent is aware of. Preferences also evolve. This may be because Ω evolves or because the agent is persuaded to change its preferences. Thus the agent's internal theory T , which includes its preferences in M L and a set of other formulae in L modelling the domain, must be explicitly represented in the agent's state. In this model we do not impose any specific requirements on T . Hence the following definition:
Definition 3. A Negotiation State for an agent a at time t is any 3-tuple s = Ω, T, H , where
-Ω is a finite collection of negotiable issues.
-T ⊆ L ∪ M L, is a theory in the common languages.
-H, the negotiation history, is the set of all negotiation threads involving agent a. That is, H = {ϑ i↔a |i ∈ Agents}.
All possible negotiation states for agent a will be denoted by S a .
As an illustration of how these notions are used, consider the following example:
Example 1. The CSD agent is negotiating with a V C i agent for the Vet Customer service for company A. The CSD agent proposes that the service be completed for £10 and should take 24 hours. V C i responds that company A is known to be in financial difficulty and therefore a more time consuming and expensive vetting should be undertaken (Figure 2, id 8) . Moreover, in order to meet the deadline, V C i will need to delay the vetting of another BT customer (company B) for which an agreement has already been reached. This dialogue may be represented in CL as the sequence:
accept(V C i , CSD, Company = A ∧ price = £20 ∧ time = 48h), t 3 ) This example shows how the range of issues Ω involved in the negotiation is extended (the delaying of the vet customer service for company B) and how new information (the fact that company A is known to be in financial difficulty) can be brought to bear. This revelation of information means that the CSD agent extends its domain theory T (to include the fact that A may not be creditworthy). 
Persuasive agents
As the previous example already showed, the illocutionary acts in CL built from I pers allow arguments to be made in support of a deal. The basic building block for argumentation is appeal(a, b, ξ, The interpretation of a persuasive argument for a formula determines whether the hearing agent changes its theory. To make a choice the agent considers the (possibly conflicting) arguments coming from other agents, and from itself, as proofs generated by its own theory. In our domain, and in other work on MAS [2] , the social role between the agents is a determining factor for deciding which argument should be preferred. Hence, an authority relation is derived from the social roles and this is then used as the mechanism for comparing arguments. Precisely which social roles correspond to a power relation between the agents depends on the particular domain. In this scenario, for example, the role 'contractor' determines a power relation between the CSD agent and the vetting companies. To build a graph representing as directed links the authority that an agent has over another, we take the labelled graph associated with the social relation R and construct a new one by removing the links labelled with non-power roles, and by adding the necessary links to make the relation represented in the graph transitive. Hence the following definition: Definition 4. Given a Dialogical Framework DF = Agents, Roles, R, L, M L, CL, T ime and a set of authority roles P ower ⊆ Roles, we define the authority graph, AG ⊆ Agents × Agents, for DF as:
We say an authority graph is well defined if it is acyclic.
The authority graph encodes the authority relation--or lack of it, since in general AG is not totally connected-between any two agents. Now, our position is that in this domain the 'power' of an argument is determined solely by the authority of the agents which contribute formulae to its construction. Hence, it is necessary to extend the notion of authority from a relation between agents, as captured in the authority graph, to a relation over sets of agents which will be used to establish which arguments to prefer. There are two obvious ways of defining such a relation. These are as follows. We say that a set of agents A has lower minimum authority than B, A < min B, if and only if for all b ∈ B there exists a ∈ A such that (b, a) ∈ AG. And that A has lower maximum authority than B, A < max B, if and only if for all a ∈ A there exists b ∈ B such that (b, a) ∈ AG. Thus, intuitively, the order < min assumes that if any formula used in the argument was proposed by somebody low in the authority graph the argument is weak, while < max assumes that as soon as any formula in the argument is proposed by somebody high in the authority graph the argument is strong. Obviously, other authority relations might also be proposed. From now on we refer to any authority relation by the symbol <.
An argument, in its most general form [1] , is a proof for a formula. We assume that all agents share the same deductive systems for L (⊢ L ) and ML (⊢ M L ). Hence, in this restricted context, a proof can be represented as the conjunction of all the formulae used in it because it can be reconstructed by the agent receiving it. An argument is then a formula ϕ ∈ L ∪ M L ∪ CL that might be constructed from atomic formulae present initially in the theory of the agent or obtained in previous negotiation encounters from different agents. Assuming the existence of a function Support : L∪M L∪Cl → 2 Agents that gives the agents whose formulae are used in the construction of an argument, or the agent that uttered the illocution when ϕ ∈ CL. We can use the social role of those agents to decide how forceful an argument is.
Fundamental to the concept of argumentation is the idea that an argument may attack another [3] . We represent the fact that an argument Arg supports a formula ϕ as a pair (Arg, ϕ) and the fact that the argument pair (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ) attacks (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ) by Attacks( (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ), (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ) ). The precise meaning of Attacks depends strongly on the concrete languages L and M L being used. For the purpose of this paper we assume it is a primitive notion [3] , because our focus is on how to resolve the effect of an attack no matter how it is defined. Definition 5. Given (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ) and (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ) such that Attacks((Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ), (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 )) then (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ) will be preferred to (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ), written (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ) ≺ (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ), if and only if Support(Arg 2 ) < Support(Arg 1 ). When (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ) ≺ (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ) and (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ) ≺ (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ) we say that an agent is indifferent with respect to the arguments-denoted by (
Argumentation is the means an agent uses to decide how to interpret incoming and generate outgoing illocutions. On receiving an argument pair (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ) that is not attacked by any argument pair (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ) built from its current theory, an open-minded agent may simply add the argument Arg 1 and the formula ϕ 1 to its theory. In contrast, a more conservative agent may not accept a proposition unless it comes from a higher authority. When Attacks((Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ), (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 )) the most preferred (in the sense defined above) argument pair is kept. If (Arg 1 , ϕ 1 ) ∼ (Arg 2 , ϕ 2 ) some additional criteria must be applied to decide which to keep, for instance epistemic entrenchment [4] .
Example 2. The DD and SD agents are negotiating over the Survey Customer Site service. DD proposes that the service should be completed within 24 hours. SD indicates that one of its surveyors was planning to go on holiday and so the survey will take 48 hours (Figure 2, id 9) . DD indicates that it must have the service completed within 24 hours. In CL it is expressed as:
1. offer(DD, SD, time = 24h ∧ service = Survey Customer Site, t 1 ) 2. appeal(SD, DD, time = 48h, surveyor(Smith) ∧ holiday(Smith), t 2 ) 3. appeal(DD, SD, time = 24h, time = 24h, t 3 )
In this example, SD issues an appeal to DD for more time to complete the survey service. DD rejects this argument saying the service must be completed within 24 hours. SD now has two arguments that attack one another -Attacks((surveyor(Smith)∧holiday(Smith), time = 48h), (time = 24h, time = 24h)). It resolves them by referring to its authority graph which indicates that the authority of DD's argument is more powerful than its own (since DD is its boss, that is, (DD, SD) ∈ AG) and therefore it must do whatever is necessary to ensure the service is completed within 24 hours. That is, Support(surveyor(Smith) ∧ holiday(Smith)) = {SD}, Support(time = 24h) = {DD} and given that (DD, SD) ∈ AG we have that (surveyor(Smith) ∧ holiday(Smith), time = 48h) ≺ (time = 24h, time = 24h) because in our example {SD} < {DD} (using either of the measures mentioned in this section). 
Interpretation and Generation of Illocutions
For pragmatical reasons we separate the definition of the semantics of illocutions into a pair different operations, I and G (see examples 3 and 4). The former implements the negotiation-state transition associated with hearing a given illocution, and the latter determines the illocutionary action to be taken in a particular state.
The underlying idea is that any illocution may introduce new issues in a negotiation, while appeals may, in addition, modify the preference relationships and the agent's theory. However, the actual effect of an illocution depends on the agent's interpretation of the utterances. This interpretation process is highly domain-specific and is also dependent upon the specific internal structures present in the agent architecture. For this reason, we illustrate how our framework can be used to define a comparatively simple open-minded agent. Naturally this does not prescribe how all agents should behave, but rather exemplifies the concepts of our model which can be used to define many other types of agent.
Our illocution interpretation function I for open-minded agent is based on the following intuitions:
-Every illocution extends the corresponding negotiation thread in the history kept in the current state 7 . In this way, for example, complete illocutionary histories allow agents with total-recall to be modelled. Forgetful agents can then be modelled through their specific theories.
-All illocutions may introduce new issues in the current negotiation.
-Appeals may change the preference relationship. They may change the theory as well, provided that the current theory and the role definition in the dialogical framework support such an update. 
Finally, an agent a's specification must include a way of computing the next illocution to be uttered in the negotiation thread. That is a function G : S a × DF → CL needs to be defined. This function must conform with the protocol depicted in Figure 3 and can conveniently be represented as a collection of condition-action rules, where the action is an illocutionary action. How an agent chooses which illocution to utter depends on many factors: the history of the negotiation, the active goals of the agent, or its theory, and it also depends on the way that particular agent interprets those illocutions.
The following example illustrates a simple negotiation dialogue between two agents and contains a fragment of a G function.
Example 4.
We use an expanded version of the argument presented in Example 2 to illustrate specific instances of illocution generation and interpretation functions. Given the two initial illocution interchanges:
1. offer(DD, SD, time = 24h ∧ service = Survey Customer Site, t 1 ) 2. appeal(SD, DD, time = 48h, surveyor(Smith) ∧ holiday(Smith), t 2 )
We show two decisions taken by two different types of agent; an 'authoritarian' DD agent which exploits its social power (threat to inform the company chairman SD has not agreed to complete the task within 24h), and a 'conciliatory' DD agent which resorts to an explanatory appeal (that it is company policy that quotes must be handled within 24h):
3.1 Authoritarian: threaten(DD, SD, not accept(SD, DD, time = 24h, t 3 ), appeal(DD, Chairman, not accept(SD, DD, time = 24h, t 3 ), t 4 )) 3.2 Conciliatory: appeal(DD, SD, time = 24h, BT P olicy T ime = 24h, t 3 )
The G function of an 'obedient' SD agent that whenever possible will always do what it is told could then include the following decision rules:
ifθ x↔self = threaten(x, self, not accept(self, x, δ), ψ2) and (x, self ) ∈ AG and can do(δ) then accept(self, x, δ) ifθ x↔self = threaten(x, self, not accept(self, x, δ), ψ2) and (x, self ) ∈ AG and not can do(δ) then δ ′ = compute counter offer(s, DF );offer(self, x, δ ′ ) ifθ x↔self = appeal(x, self, ξ, ϕ) and ψ → ¬ϕ ∈ T then appeal(self, x, ¬ϕ, ψ)
Assuming that can do(time = 24h ∧ service = Survey Customer Site) is true, by subcontracting the task say, the dialogue with the authoritarian DD ends with:
4.1 accept(SD, DD, time = 24h ∧ service = Survey Customer Site, t 4 )
On the other hand if we assume that the rule BT Policy Time = 24h ↔ Fully staffed is true and DD utters 3.1, the agent could reply by:
To further illustrate the power of our framework, the following table shows the representation in CL of the arguments presented in Figure 2 .
Id Dialogue
a F uture is an universally quantified variable over the future instants of time in T ime.
3 threaten(DD, SD, not acccept(SD, DD, . . . ∧ time < limit), appeal(DD, BossSD, ψ a ,not acccept(SD, DD, . . . ∧ time < limit))) a ψ expressing the fact that the deadline has been missed.
The reward consists on passing the information to our boss. c ψ represents the satisfaction of Customeri.
a ∆ is a universally quantified variable standing for a deal. b F uture stands for an instant in future. Much of the extant work on agent-based negotiation is rooted in game theory, eg. [17] . Although this approach has produced significant results, and has proved successful for dealing with many interesting negotiation domains, it embodies a number of limiting assumptions about the agents' knowledge and utility functions. Even when this approach is extended as in [11] to cope with conditions that change over time, it does not address the problem of how these changes can be accomplished by one agent influencing another, nor does it cope with the problem of introducing new issues into an open negotiation. Changing preferences through persuasion, in multi-agent systems, was addressed in Sycara's seminal work on labour negotiation [18] , work which was extended and formalised by Kraus et al. [10] . However, this work is set within the context of a particular agent architecture (another variation on the belief/desire/intention theme), assures a fixed and shared domain theory, and deals with five particular types of argument (threats, rewards, appeals to precedent, appeals to prevailing practice, and appeals to self-interest). Furthermore, Kraus et al. do not deal with the introduction of new issues or imperfect rationality.
In contrast, our model accommodates partial knowledge, imperfect rationality and the introduction of new negotiation issues-which are relevant features in many application domains-while only imposing minimal requirements on agents' internal states and using a very general rhetorical language.
At this point we should also acknowledge the differences between our work and other work on argumentation in artificial intelligence where it is often used as a means of explaining how a single agent reasons. That is, an agent argues with itself to establish its beliefs and depending upon the way in which this is done its reasoning accords to that prescribed by one of the multitude of non-monotonic reasoning mechanisms proposed in the literature [3] . Our work is clearly in the context of many agents and the arguments are intended as a method of changing another agents' beliefs and actions. The other important difference is that the mechanism for resolving conflicts between arguments is often built into the logical language in which arguments are constructed and is based upon some intuitive notion of what is correct in the world at large. In contrast, we keep this mechanism at the meta-level and ground it in knowledge about the domain. This has the dual advantage of ensuring that conflicts are resolved in a way that is known to be suitable for our domain whilst allowing new conflict resolution mechanisms to be easily fitted into the model in different domains.
Conclusion
This paper has introduced a novel framework for describing persuasive negotiations between autonomous agents. This provides a sound foundation for building specific artificial agents by instantiating the generic components such as L, M L and T . The framework has been strongly influenced by our experience of business process management applications which leads us to be confident that it can capture the needs of other real world applications. However, we realise that there are a number of issues which require further investigation. First there is the matter of how expressive CL is required to be. For instance, at the moment an agent can only threaten and promise to do other illocutionary actions (e.g. to tell somebody about something). It is also desirable that other, non-illocutionary, actions could be the consequence of a threat or a reward. Similarly, while appeals could be used to model a wide range of illocutions, it may be useful to charcaterise subtly different types of illocution through more refined interpretation and generation functions. Second, we have reflected an agent's preferences, and the changes in those preferences, simply as sentences and updates in the agent's theory T . We realise that further work is required to tie these preferences to notions of rationality, in particular to standard ideas of expected utility. Finally, we make the simplifying assumption that negotiating agents have a common notion of deduction. This may be inadequate for some domains in which case it will be necessary for agents to be able to discuss what rules of inference are appropriate.
